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I. EXTENDED ABSTRACT
A. Problem Statement and Related Work: Detecting Misbe-
having Nodes in DSR
The successful operation of a mobile ad hoc network
depends on cooperation of the nodes in providing services
to each other. Nodes act both as terminals and information
relays, and participate in a common routing protocol, such
as Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [13]. The network is
vulnerable due to faulty or malicious nodes. Misbehavior
detection systems aim at removing this vulnerability [1], [2],
[3], [4], [6], [7].
Our approach for misbehavior detection in DSR is to use
an Artificial Immune System (AIS) [14], [15]. The system is
inspired by the natural immune system of vertebrates [10].
The main task of the natural immune system (the IS) is
to protect the human body against microorganism invaders
and some malfunctioning own cells, while being tolerant to
normal own cells, self cells. To accomplish this task, the
IS has developed some detection and reaction mechanisms
and procedures, which may be useful for solving analogous
problems in building an AIS.
The work presented here is a continuation of our previous
work [6], [7]. In the previous work we proposed a solution for
mapping some basic parts of the IS to our AIS: representation,
matching, and negative and clonal selection. We implemented
and validated the solution in the Glomosim simulator [11]. The
system had a separate preliminary phase for collecting self-
behavior examples. This phase had to be run in a protected
environment, when there is no misbehavior of the nodes. It is
very hard to provide such conditions in a real network.
In this work we give three main improvements for our AIS.
First, we propose a solution that doesn’t require a preliminary
learning phase in the protected environment (the environment
without misbehavior). The solution uses analogy with the
IS danger signal [8], [9]. Second, we add the innate part
of the AIS, which provides fast detection of misbehavior
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patterns that are known in advance and for which specific
detection mechanisms are designed. For the innate part we
adopt solution given in [3]. Third, we introduce information
exchange between the nodes, which is analogous to the use
of cytokines in the IS; for the information exchange we use
the robust reputation scheme proposed in [2]. In our previous
work, there was one immune system per network node; with
this third improvement, there is one global immune system,
distributed across all nodes.
B. Learning Changing Self in an Unprotected Environment.
Use of Danger Signal.
The main difficulties for providing self-tolerance in our case
are caused by the fact that the system to be protected (mobile
ad hoc network running DSR) changes over time. This is
because of mobility, changes in nodes’ traffic and software
updates. The AIS need to learn to differentiate between new
normal behavior and misbehavior. Our solution for learning
changing self, that works well if started in possibly unprotected
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Fig. 1. Learning self antigens in an unprotected environment. The scheme
works even if misbehavior is present during both initial and normal operation
phase.
The main idea is to use the quality of service (QoS) obtained
by a node when is communicating over some neighbors,
1
2and correlate it with matching results on the antigens that
are describing observed behavior for that neighbors in the
near past. QoS measures that we use are throughput of TCP
connections and response time of applications which use UDP,
as compared to their estimated normal values. An antigen is
created from the data collected during an interval ∆t. For more
details on representation, matching, and classification see [6],
[7].
Here is how the scheme shown in Figure 1 works. Initially,
all collected self antigens become ’candidate self antigens’,
until S becomes full. Then the initial set of antibodies is
created. Subsequently collected antigens are buffered in B.
They will be checked for matching, and detection results will
be temporally stored in C, for both antibodies and antigens.
The corresponding node and the time of the detection are also
temporarily stored in C. The storing time is determined by
T5 (Ti are system constants). T5 controls how much time on
average are detection results collected for some node, before
it is classified as misbehaving.
If there is no matching between the current set of antibodies
and an antigen that is collected by the node for one of its
neighbors, if no bad QoS is experienced by the node over that
neighbor, and if no bad QoS is reported in a sufficient amount
for that neighbor by others, in the near past, the antigen will
be used for the updating S. The minimal update interval is
determined by the constant ∆T; it controls the maximum speed
of change of the protected system that may be followed by the
AIS, when QoS is good.
The antigens that belong to a node, for which there is
enough evidence that it misbehaves, will not be used for
updating S. The evidence is calculated from own detections
and experienced QoS, and the detections and QoS reported
by neighbors. By this distributed filtering, we achieve that S
is updated with self antigens. Updates by nonself antigens
happen quite rarely, because we use additional latency T1
(in addition to T5) in updating the set of self antigens; this
time constant is larger than the time needed by the system to
detect the node which generated it, unless we have persistently
good QoS in the near past (T4). A nonself antigen that passes
this barriers and deletes antibodies reactive to it will also be
detected and eliminated from S, but only by the correlating
it to bad QoS, and after a longer time, and then again the
antibodies will be created that contain knowledge of this
antigen and speeds up the detection.
There are two types of antibodies: normal, with T3 half
life time, and memory, that has an infinite life time. Normal
antibodies die if they are not useful in detection for some
time. Our AIS deletes self-reactive memory antibodies, unlike
in the IS case. If a memory antibody consistently matches
antigens collected during good QoS in the neighborhood, it
will be deleted. In this way, we solve the problem of chronical
auto-immunity that is usually caused by mimicry between
self and experienced nonself antigens. Such a solution is not
used by the IS, because of antigen presenting cells APC and
lymphocyte trafficking constraints [10].
C. Using both the innate and the adaptive part
The innate part of the natiral IS has fast detection and
reaction against some pathogens with known nonself patterns
on their surface. For some misbehavior types, the innate part
may detect that an attack is maybe going on, but it has no
appropriate detection and reaction to resolve the problem. In
both cases it signals to the adaptive part, mobilizing more
resources of the adaptive part. This signaling is important
because some of attacks are not solved by the innate part,
but by the adaptive part or by a cooperative effort.
The part of our solution described in Section I-B is the
adaptive part of our AIS. We add the innate part by coding
mechanisms that directly detect events which refer to mis-
behavior or possibility of misbehavior. Such events are non-
forwarding route request or data packets, and some unallowed
changes in protocol fields in relayed packets. Our innate
system influences the adaptive system in that the adaptive
systems reacts more quickly when there is evidence that
the innate part has detected anomalies. This is analogous to
battlefield cytokines in the natural IS.
D. Distributed AIS. Cooperation of nodes. Information ex-
change
Detection, classification and QoS information are exchanged
between the nodes adopting the reputation system proposed
in [2], [3]. This provides faster gathering the evidence needed
for safe classification of nodes as misbehaving, and reaction
against them. It also changes our analogy to the natural IS in
that the body to be protected is now the entire network instead
of nodes in isolation.
E. Model Validation
We implement and validate our model in the ns-2 simulator
[12]. We show improvements over previous work in time to
response, ability to detect new attacks, and false positive ratios.
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